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EDITORIAL
Contingent Liability Several readers of The Journal of
for Repurchase
Accountancy have drawn attention to
Contracts
what they believe to be heresy in an
article which appeared in the February issue of this magazine.
The offending paragraphs occur in a discussion of instalment
financing contributed by C. A. H. Narlian. After considering the
effect of the repurchase agreement which is becoming a common
clause in financing companies’ practice, particularly those which
have to do with the purchase of motor cars, Mr. Narlian said:
“ The principal factor in an agreement of this kind may be said to place
upon the dealer the obligation to accept delivery of repossessions made by
the finance company resulting from the purchaser’s failure to meet his
instalments and thereupon to reimburse the finance company for the
unpaid balance. Under this plan, the finance company is called upon to
repossess the car and to deliver it to the dealer, and in the event of a
material collision damage, the agreement usually obligates the finance
company to make due allowance therefor to the dealer.
“Legal opinions rendered by the highest authorities agree that under the
repurchase-agreement plan, it is unnecessary for the dealer’s balance-sheet
to show any contingent liability, and this principle appears to be fully
accepted by the banks.”

Our readers who have criticized the statements made by Mr.
Narlian seem to have overlooked the fact that he does not speak
at all of accounting opinions. The address from which these
paragraphs were taken was delivered at a meeting of the New
York State Society of Certified Public Accountants. Mr. Narlian
no doubt fully understood that his audience was competent to
decide the accounting question involved; consequently, he referred
solely to matters of law and banking practice. Indeed, the
omission of reference to accounting opinion is quite noticeable.
There is, however, this much to be said in support of the critics:
the author might have added that legal opinions have nothing
whatever to do with the case. It is wholly a question of what is
or what is not proper accounting procedure; and there does not
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seem to be any valid reason to believe that accountants as a
whole would subscribe to the theory that a repurchase clause is
not a contingent liability of such importance as to merit inclusion
in a balance-sheet. We believe that the great preponderance of
opinion would incline to the theory that a contingent liability of
anything more than insignificant magnitude must be shown,
whatever the degree of contingency may be.

To support this assertion of the attitude
of accountants, it is interesting to quote
from certain opinions which are soon to
be published in a bulletin now in course of preparation by the
bureau of information of the American Institute of Accountants.
This bureau, as most of our readers know, is a clearing house of
question and answer upon accounting principles. The questions
asked are placed before several competent authorities for reply
and the answers are then sent to the accountant or the firm that
inquires. In the correspondence which is now before us, we find a
question relative to the treatment of the contingent liability in the
case of accounts receivable sold subject to a repurchase plan.
This is on all fours with the question arising in the case of a re
purchase clause in finance-company contracts. The inquiry was
sent to a number of prominent accounting firms and in order to
support our contention that the contingency should be shown, we
quote the following extracts from replies received:
Accounting Opinion
Is Firm

1. “One fact in connection with the business under consideration which
appears to be essential to a true understanding of its financial position is
that its bankers hold large amounts of accounts receivable which it may be
required to repurchase for cash in case debtors default. Another fact of
importance to one seeking to know the financial status of the business is
that experience in the past has been that losses in connection with such
‘ repurchases ’ have been negligible.
“ The client apparently urges that the second fact be offset against the
first and that both be eliminated from the accountant’s report. From the
information given it does not appear that such an offset can properly be
made.
“On the other hand, we feel that it is important that both of the facts
mentioned be definitely presented, because both of them would be of
practical informative value to anyone who may study the statement.
“ Going a little beyond the scope of the question, it seems to us that the
client should logically be entirely satisfied to have the statement presented
with both of these facts included, because it would seem that any un
favorable impression which might be made by admitting the amount of
contingent liabilities would be more than overcome by the fact that losses
in connection with such liabilities had been negligible in the past, and by
the effect of the desire to present the ‘ whole picture ’ which desire would be
evidenced by including these facts in the certificate or in the statement.”
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2. “ It seems that your interrogator might well have directed his client’s
attention to the provisions in this connection contained in the pamphlet,
Approved Methods for the Preparation of Balance-sheet Statements, published
in the Federal Reserve Bulletin for April, 1917. They are as follows:
“ Contingent liabilities.—‘ It is not enough that a balance sheet shows what
must be paid; it should set forth with as much particularity as possible
what may have to be paid. It is the duty of an auditor who makes a
balance sheet audit to discover and report upon liabilities of every
description, not only liquidated debts but possible debts. The following
are the usual forms under which contingent liabilities will be found:
Indorsements
Guaranties
Unfilled contracts
“Notes receivable.—‘When notes receivable are discounted by banks the
company has a liability therefor which should appear on the balance
sheet. Lists of discounted notes not matured at the date of the audit
should be obtained from the banks as verification and their totals en
tered under 20a, if the cash therefor is shown as an asset.’
“Accounts receivable.—‘Inquiry must be made as to whether any of the
accounts receivable have been hypothecated or assigned and the sum
total of accounts so listed entered under 20b.’
“The above references to ‘20a’ and ‘20b’ refer to sub-classifications
shown under the main classification of secured liabilities which appears on
the liability side of the form of balance-sheet contained in the Federal
Reserve Bulletin. These sub-classifications are as follows:
‘ 20a—Notes receivable discounted or sold with indorsement or guaranty
(contra).’
‘20b—Customers’ accounts discounted or assigned (contra).’
‘ 20c—Obligations secured by liens on inventories.’
‘20d—Obligations secured by securities deposited as collateral.’
“Whether obligations for the repurchase of instalment notes and ac
counts receivable are shown as direct liabilities in the manner required by
the above quotations from the Federal Reserve Bulletin, or are shown as
contingent liabilities in foot-notes to the balance-sheet, is a matter to be
governed largely by the client’s preference; the important matter being, of
course, that the balance sheet discloses the existence of the obligations.
“The fact that losses experienced by the company in repurchasing
instalment accounts during the past few years have been negligible is quite
irrelevant to the question of the necessity of disclosing the existence of the
obligation to repurchase the unpaid accounts.”
3. “We have on more than one occasion insisted upon mentioning
in balance-sheets the fact that the concern had disposed of instalment
paper subject to a repurchase agreement. We believe that in most cases
these so-called repurchase agreements call for the finance company’s
repossessing the merchandise and selling the merchandise to the business
concern for the amount outstanding on the paper. Accordingly, it is
maintained by some finance companies—and perhaps some accountants
and bankers—that the position of the business concern with respect to its
obligation to repurchase the merchandise is precisely the same as it is with
respect to any other commitments for the purchase of merchandise, which,
admittedly, do not have to be recognized in the balance-sheet. Notwith
standing this argument, we believe that any person who is considering the
financial condition of the concern is entitled to know that the concern has
disposed of its receivables and may have to take some of them back.
There is some doubt as to whether this commitment can properly be
characterized as a contingent liability, but the fact remains, we think, that
it is an important factor in the consideration of financial condition.
“ If the repurchase agreement does not call for the repossessing of the
merchandise by the finance company and the purchase of the repossessed
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merchandise by the business concern from the finance company, but merely
calls for a reversal of the transaction whereby the paper was purchased
by the finance company, it seems to us that the situation is not essentially
different from an assignment with recourse; and, that being the case, there
seems to be a definite contingent liability.
“We are very much interested in the statement in the letter that the
attitude of the client is supported by several banks. We took the trouble
to canvass a number of large banks on this subject, and found that without
exception they insisted that information regarding such transactions
should be shown in the balance-sheet.”

4. “It is our opinion that a balance-sheet should show all liabilities, both
actual and contingent. The exact liability which the concern who sold
the accounts receivable may be called upon to meet, is difficult of determi
nation. Therefore, we feel that reference thereto, in the form of explana
tory memoranda on the face of the balance-sheet, should be sufficient.
The important thing is that their existence be disclosed and that such data
as will give an idea of the nature, status and amount be clearly set forth.
In other words, show the total amount of outstanding accounts sold and
the nature of the repurchase agreement. If there has been any experience
as to the amount which the concern has been called upon to repurchase in
the past, these data might be shown for the information of bankers and
others who make use of the balance-sheet.”

Other replies were in agreement with the principles enunciated in
the foregoing quotations. There was no reply in which the
slightest approval was given to the theory that contingent
liabilities of this sort, even when most unlikely to become actual
liabilities, should not be disclosed. It may be assumed, therefore,
that the weight of accounting opinion is entirely in support of the
principle that a contingency of any magnitude must be clearly set
forth.
It will be noted that one of the letters
Bankers and Lawyers
from
which we have quoted draws
May Not Agree
attention to the provision in the pam
phlet Approved Methods for the Preparation of Balance-sheet
Statements, issued by the federal reserve board, dealing with this
problem. There may be some bankers who would look with
complaisance upon failure to disclose contingent items if the
contingencies were extremely remote, but we do not believe that
there are many bankers who would fall in this category. It seems
to us that it could be only in extraordinary circumstances that a
banker would be willing to accept a statement which did not
reveal the true condition with all its possibilities of peril. As
has been said, however, the statement made by Mr. Narlian did
not make any claim that the views which he expressed were those
of the accounting profession. The legal opinion on an accounting
matter is not always of great value, for the lawyer is of necessity
an advocate and if any purpose could be served by reticence on the
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part of a client, the lawyer would naturally seek to find some
justification for withholding information which would prejudice
unfavorably the opinion of his client’s financial stability. This
does not infer anything derogatory to the legal profession. The
whole question of the respective duties of lawyers and of ac
countants is thoroughly understood by both the professions.
The lawyer is always a special pleader. The accountant should
be never. As a matter of fact, it is not true that the contingency
in the case of repurchase contracts is always remote. There may
be unexpected developments which will throw upon the finance
company the positive obligation to repurchase, and if this may
happen in small amount it may happen equally well in large
amount. The balance-sheet, it is axiomatic to say, is a statement
of fact and also of possibilities.
Readers of this magazine will remember
Ownership of Working
that
last year the supreme judicial
Papers
court of Massachusetts in the case
Ipswich Mills v. William Dillon, et al., decided that the ownership
of an accountant’s working papers is vested in the accountant.
The case was appealed by counsel for the American Institute of
Accountants, and the victory won in the highest court of Massa
chusetts was of the utmost importance to all accountants and,
incidentally, to all clients of accountants. There is, however, a
further question which occasionally arises upon which there has
not been a legal decision. It concerns the ownership of working
papers which were the property of an accountant who died after
the conclusion of a case in which he was retained. Such a ques
tion was brought to attention a few weeks ago, and the Hon.
J. Harry Covington, counsel for the American Institute of Ac
countants, was asked to express his opinion on the question. He
has written the following reply:
“ I beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter relating to the matter of
working papers which were the property of an accountant now deceased.
The question raised by the firm of accountants which has taken over the
estate of the deceased accountant is a novel one. Obviously there are no
precedents. But I think a careful consideration of the principles under
lying the ownership of working papers by an accountant point clearly to a
sound solution of the problem.
“In an analysis of the legal situation there must be kept in mind the
language of the supreme court of Massachusetts in the Dillon case. In
discussing the question of title the court indicated an interest of the client
in the papers by the use of three expressions as follows:
(a) ‘ It may be that these papers contained information confidential
in its nature and of importance to the plaintiff.’
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(b) ‘The interest of the plaintiff in the information collected and
copied by the defendants and the confidential nature of this information
do not give title to the plaintiff of the defendants’ working papers.’
(c) ‘ Even if it is assumed that the defendants could be enjoined from
the publication of the contents of these papers.’
In other words, while the legal title to working papers was decided to be in
the accountant, the court clearly indicated a doubt that he had any right
either to dispose of them or to make them public.
“Title to property is not necessarily free from limitations, and such must
be the case with an accountant’s working papers. If the deceased ac
countant had retired from business while alive he could not have under
taken to sell the working papers relating to the business of any client to any
person who succeeded him in practice. And, of course, it is obvious that
the estate of the deceased accountant has no greater right in the working
papers of clients than the deceased had while alive. Certainly, therefore,
his successors cannot obtain any title to working papers from the repre
sentative of his estate.
“And as there is no liability by the estate for the negligent work of a
deceased accountant there is no use whatever to which the representative
of the estate can put working papers. But assuming that the executor
may have the technical right to retain the working papers during the time
he is administering the estate they would be in a ‘ dead hand ’ so to speak,
and when he closes the estate he cannot distribute them to any heir or
representative of the deceased. The confidential nature of the property
would be thus destroyed.
“Having in mind what was said by the Massachusetts court, I conse
quently have no doubt that in an appropriate legal proceeding (the title of
the accountant to the working papers having become a right without value
or purpose) any court would find no difficulty in expanding the right of a
client to protect the confidential nature of the material in the working
papers into an unrestricted right of possession. Manifestly the accounting
profession should not be on the defendant side of such a possible legal
controversy.
“There is also, it seems to me, a controlling ethical question involved.
The whole theory of the right of the accountant to retain his working
papers against the demand of the client is based upon the proposition that
they represent peculiarly his own work as preliminary to a completed result
which the client has employed him to bring about. And as the integrity
of his work may at any time be called into question, he ought always to be
in possession of the material which demonstrates its accuracy and sound
ness. After the death of the accountant, as I have already stated, there
can arise no question of liability for negligent performance of service.
As the title is peculiarly in the accountant alone with no right of transfer
inherent in such title the accountancy profession must, it seems to me,
recognize that the interest of the client has been expanded into an imme
diate right of possession.
“ The rule I have just suggested works no hardship to partnerships for of
course the law of partnership gives to surviving partners the interest in
partnership property, and the surviving partners in an accountancy firm
are, of course, continuously liable for the soundness and accuracy of the
work done as a firm matter by a deceased partner. Their right, therefore,
to retain the working papers of a client is unaffected by the death of any
one of the partners.”

No doubt, as counsel affirms, the ethical question involved is one
that would have great weight with any competent court in a de
cision of ownership in such a case as that cited. The estate of
the accountant would not be affected by adopting the theory ex
pressed in this opinion and the rights of the client would be pro
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tected. It is very much a question of equity, when all is said and
done, and it is upon this broad basis that Judge Covington has
founded his conclusions.
The field of the accountant is con
Accountants Not
stantly growing in breadth, and some
Accepted as
Registrars
times it seems a little difficult to deter
mine what is the logical and proper boundary beyond which the
accountant should not go. The more conservative members of
the profession are somewhat perturbed at times by the apparent
inclination of clients and others to demand of the accountant a
variety of functions for which there is no precedent. There are,
of course, other developments to which every accountant would
lend his sanction. For example, the appointment of accountants
as receivers and trustees in bankruptcy has everything to recom
mend it and there is no valid argument against it. In California
there has recently been an effort to obtain authority for the
appointment of certified public accountants as registrars. The
matter was brought to the attention of the commissioner of
corporations, from whose office we have received the following
letter:
The Journal of Accountancy:
New York, N. Y.
Sometime ago Mr.----- , a certified public accountant of Los Angeles,
requested the commissioner of corporations in writing to authorize the
appointment of certified public accountants as registrars. Mr.-------- ’s
request was made in behalf of members of his profession who had received
certificates as accountants.
The commissioner has made a careful study in this matter, the results of
which are contained in a letter to Mr.-------- under date of December 15th,
a copy of which letter is herewith attached.
Briefly, the commissioner’s decision is that only trust companies, banks
or similar institutions should be approved as registrars in this state.
We believe the commissioner’s decision, together with the reasoning
upon which it is based, is of so much importance to the accountancy pro
fession, to trust companies and banks, that we are submitting the attached
letter to several publications which devote their columns to matters of
interest to the profession and institutions affected by the ruling.
If the commissioner’s letter or any portion of it is published we would
appreciate it very much if we could have a copy of the issue in which the
publication appears.
We are also attaching a resume of our investigation in this matter and
which is referred to in the commissioner’s letter to Mr.-------- .

The enclosure to which the commissioner refers expresses the
opinion that registrars, in order effectively to protect the holders
of securities, should be those qualified to do a trust business under
the laws of California or of the United States. The primary and
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specific purpose of a registrar, independent from the corporation
or its transfer agent is, according to the commissioner, to certify
and to guard against an over-issue of stock either by the corpora
tion or its transfer agent. The certification of a registrar is ac
cepted practically as a guaranty that the security issued to him
is not spurious. The commissioner then goes on to say,
“ It is obvious, therefore, that the duties and activities of the registrar
in this respect are more than a mere clerical, ministerial and mechanical
function. It is quite apparent, therefore, under these circumstances that
should the registrar abuse or violate the confidence and trust so reposed in
him by the certificate-holder ... a definite liability accrues. To pursue
this reasoning further, it would follow that the certificate holder or the
beneficiary would have recourse and redress in law against the registrar.
Manifestly, the relation between the parties reflects all the characteristic
elements of a voluntary and express trust. The theory that a registrar
stands in a fiduciary relationship to both stockholder and corporation is
seemingly and substantially supported by the authorities found in the law
reports.
“From these premises we believe the conclusion is perhaps permissible
that the activities and duties of a registrar, fundamentally and primarily,
fall within the broad and general classification of trusts. It equally
follows then, assuming that the premise is not altogether fallacious, that
those acting as registrars should qualify as such in pursuance to the law of
the state made and provided in such cases.
“ In the second place, we have made a careful survey of all the leading
exchanges and even those exchanges of smaller magnitude in the entire
country. We communicated with twenty-six exchanges variously located
from the Atlantic to the Pacific and from the most northerly part of the
country to the Gulf states and our file discloses that we received twentytwo answers, three failed to reply and one turned out to be something of a
trading corporation and not an exchange. Seventeen of the exchanges—
and they include the most important and most outstanding in the country
—absolutely require a trust company or a bank to act as registrar. Only
five, which cannot even be considered minor exchanges, make no distinc
tion in this respect. . . .
“Third, you no doubt will be able to understand and appreciate the
results that might ensue if this department decides to adopt the policy
which in effect will single out with approval certified public accountants as
registrars, particularly with regard to other professions. We feel that
under these circumstances it would be an unjust discrimination against
those others who are engaged in other professional endeavors, for instance
the legal profession, etc. They, too, like the profession of public ac
countants, hold licences from the state. The inference persists that if
everyone who holds a licence from the state to practise a trade or pro
fession qualifies as a registrar, the field becomes beyond reach, its ex
tremities become vague and its control unwieldy and affords little or no
value of the protection that is contemplated by a registrar. . . .

“ Lastly, the department must confine itself to those who apply for and
those who operate under a permit from the department and that is the
extent of our jurisdiction. Should this department assert itself without
warrant in the direction of injecting itself in the management of a corpora
tion by way of supervising and regulating the dealing of the corporation
and its beneficiaries other than stockholders and shareholders, the preced
ent would be dangerous and it would detract in no small measure from
the effectiveness of the enforcement of the law that is our charge.
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“ It is therefore obvious to us, in the light we see it, that the method of
having trust companies, banks or those others organized to do a business in
this state in conformity with the laws that apply to trust companies, is more
practical and is best calculated and designed to give the public the protec
tion that it is entitled to in the regulation of dealing in securities.”

So far as we know there has been no attempt in other parts of the
country to broaden the scope of accountancy to include the func
tions of a registrar and it does not seem probable that the opinion
rendered by the commissioner of corporations of California will
excite any violent opposition in the minds of accountants gener
ally.

A correspondent asks whether it is
proper or not for a professional account
ant who is the auditor of a corporation
to act simultaneously as a director of the corporation and also
whether it is considered proper or improper for an auditor to hold
stock in a company while he is professionally engaged as auditor.
These are significant questions and it is probable that the opinion
of the conservative members of the profession would call for a
unanimous “no” to the first and a somewhat qualified “no” to the
second. The great principle at issue is, of course, the necessityfor
absolutely impartial consideration of the company’s financial con
ditions and for frank exposition of the facts whatever may be the
effect of such exposure. It is conceivable that an accountant
could be found who would be oblivious to his personal interest
while exercising his professional function of inquisitor and judge.
There are hundreds of accountants who would not let their con
clusions be influenced knowingly by the fact of personal interest.
But from every point of view it seems eminently desirable that the
accountant should be so utterly divorced from financial or other
participation in the success or failure of an undertaking under
audit that no one could ever point an accusing finger, however
unjustly, and allege the possibility of bias. The entirely honest
accountants, of whom the overwhelming majority consists, would
be unfairly affected by personal interest, because remembering
that the imputation of iniquity might arise because of the appar
ent reason for partiality they would go to the other extreme and
become unduly destructive in criticism. It is needless to discuss
the accountant, if he exists, who would present a clean bill of
health to a sick corporation of which he happened to be a part
owner. At the worst he is rare and altogether beyond the pale of
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decency. The chief and enduring value of accountancy is not its
technical ability to analyze and suggest—it is rather the total im
partiality of its practitioners. It seems quite certain, therefore,
that in all cases, except some in which unusual conditions exist,
the accountant should be neither stockholder, bondholder nor an
officer or a director of a corporation to which he accepts appoint
ment as auditor. But the exceptions are worth consideration and
there are times when an auditor may be almost compelled to act
as director. For example, it happens now and then that a com
pany passing through reorganization or some other form of meta
morphosis needs the directing mind of the man who has been its
auditor and knows the facts better than anyone else knows them.
In such cases there is not the least cause to question the propriety
of the accountant if he joins the board of directors and acts as
auditor at the same time, but—and here is the vital desideratum—
it must always be distinctly understood by security holders and
potential investors that the dual relationship prevails. The ar
rangement must be openly made and openly carried out. Then
no one can truthfully say that the auditor is guilty even of unwis
dom. He is acting merely at the will of the owners who know all
about it.

The possible correctness of acting as
director and auditor at the same time
does not affect in any way the impro
priety of accepting engagement as auditor in a corporation in
which one has a substantial interest. It would perhaps be a
counsel of perfection to suggest that it would be wrong for an ac
countant to hold a few shares of stock in a corporation after he had
been appointed to make an audit and to report, but there are
many accountants who make it an invariable rule to sever any
personal interest which they may have when called in to act as
auditors. It would be extremely difficult also to determine at
what point an interest might be considered substantial. Could an
auditor properly hold one hundred shares or two hundred? If
not two hundred, might he retain one hundred and one—and so on
without ever reaching a decision. When a question of this general
sort was before the committee on professional ethics of the Ameri
can Institute of Accountants some time ago, the chairman ex
pressed himself in emphatic manner. He said:
Should the Auditor
be a Stockholder?

“The principal value of an accountant’s certificate is that it is supposed
to be given by a competent, disinterested and impartial party. When an
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auditor certifies to the accounts of a company whose policies have been
determined to a greater or lesser extent by himself, the certificate would
not have much more value than if he were certifying to his own accounts.
The benefit of an independent judgment is missing in such a certificate, no
matter how honestly and carefully the auditor may have done his work.
The same comment would apply in respect to an auditor certifying to the
accounts of a company in which he had a substantial investment, as his
judgment as an investor could not help but affect his judgment as an
auditor, and the benefit of an independent judgment would be lacking.
“ I am of the opinion that a disclosure of the dual relation of the auditor
to the company should have been made to the bank at the time that his
report was submitted, as this would be one of the elements to which the
bank officials would have given consideration.
“ I would not go so far as to say that it would be improper for an auditor,
or his firm, to certify to the accounts of a large corporation in which he
happened to own a few shares of stock, but wherever the investment is
sufficient to question his disinterestedness, he should not certify to the
accounts without a full disclosure of his relation.
“ I have been informed of at least one firm of accountants whose partners
do not invest in the stock of any company to whose accounts they certify.”
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